While Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) suggest using business cycle in tactical asset allocation with commodity futures, Jensen et al (2002) suggest using monetary policy in guiding the timing of investment. We investigate whether it is useful to watch both. The performance of out-of-sample optimal portfolios show that the proposed strategy with commodity futures performs better than (i) any standalone assets (stocks, bonds, commodity futures); (ii) the optimal portfolio without commodity futures and (iii) strategies that consider only one type of information.
Introduction
In this paper, we explore the implications of business cycle and monetary policy for tactical asset allocation with commodity futures. According to Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , investors should include commodity futures in their diversified portfolios in the early stage of a recession and the late stage of an expansion (henceforth 'boom' to differentiate an expansion from an expansive monetary policy). Following another lead, Jensen, Johnson and Mercer (2002) conclude that investors should increase their exposure to commodity futures and reduce their weights to equities during restrictive monetary phases. There are three problems with these two conclusions. First and most important, the two conclusions are just based on in-sample analysis. Second, based on historical data from nber and Fed, we find that in most of recessions the Fed applied an expansionary monetary policy (by lowering the discount rate), especially during this current crisis. Thus, there is a conflict: following Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , investors should put more weights on commodity futures in this period of recession, but according to Jensen, Johnson and Mercer (2002) , they should do the reverse.
One way to try and solve the conundrum is to hypothesize that the effect of monetary policy varies with the stages of recessions and booms (early, middle or late). The third issue is that, as we know, business cycles are announced after the fact. For instance, the current recession was announced by nber in December 2007 while it actually started in July 2007. We thus cannot make use the actual beginning and end business cycle in a feasible trading strategy for investors. We solve this problem by using the average duration of recessions and booms to get the ex ante or predicted stages of a business cycle rather than the ex post or realized ones.
In the next paragraphs, we summarize the current literature about asset allocation with commodity futures -why should we include commodity futures in a diversified portfolio; how do Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , Jensen, Johnson and Mercer (2002) obtain their conclusions -and explain our research questions.
Although commodities have been considered as an investible asset class since at least 1978 by Greer (1978) , widespread inclusion of commodities in the asset allocation decision is a more recent phenomenon. Most published studies concludes that commodities are an unique asset class that provide diversification through superior return, relative to the traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds, owing to their low and perhaps even negative correlation with stocks, bonds and other commodities while offering positive correlation with inflation. 1 That is why in the early literature a commodity is treated as a key inflation hedge (Greer, 1994) . In addition, Bjornson and Carter (1997) , and Weiser (2003) report that expected commodity returns and commodity futures returns all depend on the business cycle of the economy. In particular, Bjornson and Carter (1997) find that commodity expected returns are lower during times of high interest rates, expected inflation and economic growth, and Weiser (2003) reports that commodity futures returns change with different stages of a business cycle.
Studies about the role of commodity futures in a diversified portfolio (Lummer and Siegel (1993) , Kaplan and Lummer (1997) , Greer (2000) , Jensen, Jonson and Mercer (2000, 2002) , Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , Erb and Harvey (2006) , Ibbotson Associates (2006) , Laws and Thompson (2007) , and Roache (2008) ) all bring out the same conclusions: under the appropriate circumstances, a diversified portfolio with commodity futures provides higher average returns and a better Sharpe ratio than the traditional portfolio of stocks, bonds and even real estate. This conclusion is also robust for international investors when taking into account the international stock market or the stock markets of other countries (Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , and Laws and Thompson (2007) ). However, all of these studies use just hindsight.
Moreover, these studies all rely on the positive correlation between commodity futures and inflation to explain for the better performance of commodity futures in some economic conditions. They seem to ignore the relationship between commodity futures and the real economic activity which (we think) may be more important. Therefore, the most important issues in asset allocation with commodity futures are (i) under what economic circumstances should the commodity futures be included in a diversified portfolio, and (ii) which factors drive the better performance for commodity futures in such circumstances. The answer to the first question is related to the above finding that commodity futures returns' behavior varies with the business cycle and monetary policy.
Relating to this question, on the one hand Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) find that commodity futures perform well in the early stage of a recession when stock and bond returns are negative, but commodity futures returns are positive. However, in the later phase of a recession, the signs of the returns reverse: stock and bond returns are positive while commodity futures' become negative. They also show that when stock and bond returns are below their overall average, in the late boom and early recession stages, commodity returns are positive and outperform both stocks and bonds. More importantly, Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) also report a positive correlation between commodity futures returns and inflation, unexpected inflation and changes in expected inflation. Consistent with these studies, Hess, Huang and Niessen (2008) (HHN) report a positive (negative) reaction of commodity futures prices to the news about higher (lower) inflation and real activity during recessions while they find no significant reactions during booms. They argue that higher expected inflation or higher real activity has a positive effect on commodity futures prices due to higher demand for commodities. However, higher expected inflation can also result in a negative effect due to rises in interest rates, which according to Frankel (2006) lowers commodity futures returns. HHN then argue that the positive and negative effects cancel out during booms while during recessions, when the interest rate concern is lower, the positive effect dominates. All above studies confirm that including commodity futures in a portfolio helps to hedge against high inflation in a recession. 2 However, as mentioned before this result does not yet imply a feasible trading strategy for investors, because business cycles are announced ex post.
Following another lead, Jensen, Johnson and Mercer (2002) use the Federal Reserve's monetary policy in guiding the timing of investment in commodity futures. They conclude that investors can use an ex ante monetary policy indicator to guide portfolio allocation across stocks and commodity futures. During expansive monetary phases (i.e. following a drop in the discount rate), exposure to equities should be increased while exposure to commodity futures should be reduced. During restrictive phases (i.e. following an increase in the discount rate), an opposite strategy is taken. Jensen et al. find that futures are prominent in mean variance efficient portfolios when the Fed pursues a restrictive monetary policy, but have insignificant weights when an expansive policy is applied. They state that periods of restrictive monetary policy tend to coincide with periods of heightened inflationary concerns; thus, this evidence echoes the view that commodity futures act as an inflation hedge. This study has one advantage over the Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) study: it has practical implications in tactical asset allocation because a change in the discount rate is immediately observable rather than detected month after the fact. However, their tactical allocation is still not tested out-of-sample. In addition, their explanation for the results brings up an issue that the above studies already mentioned: what happens if the negative effect of the increase in interest rate 2 With our data, we also observe that the mean of inflation is higher in recessions than in booms. cancels out or swamps the positive effect of the induced high inflation?
Because of the conflict in applying these two recommendations in a recession, our first research question is what the implication is of monetary policies in tactical asset allocation in different stages of recessions and booms: is there an interaction effect between monetary policy and business cycle? The second question is what drives the better performance of commodity futures under specific conditions: the positive correlation between commodity futures and inflation (following Greer, 1978; Frankel, 2006) or the link between commodity and the real economic activity. How we can exploit the effect of the business cycle in asset allocation (as the nber announcement is ex post) is the third issue. Fourth, we want to check the validity of our proposed strategy out-of-sample.
To address these research questions, we use monthly data from 1/1970 to 8/2009 with, in addition, three sub-samples: (i) the Gorton and Rouwenhorst's sample (GR sample) from 4/1973 to 12/2007; (ii) an in-sample test period from 1/1970 to 12/1985 which we use to extract the proposed tactical allocation and (iii) the out-of-sample testing period to verify the validity of the proposed strategy. We compare the mean returns and Sharpe ratios for different asset classes, namely stocks, bonds, and commodity futures, in different stages of recessions and booms in the context of different monetary policies. Diverging from the Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) method, we propose to divide a business cycle into three stages (early, middle, late) instead of two stages. In order to exploit the effect of the business cycle in tactical asset allocation, we propose to use the average duration of a recession and a boom to get three ex ante stages for a business cycle following nber's announcement. For out-of-sample testing, we follow Markowitz to construct the optimal mean-variance efficient portfolio with and without commodity futures for each economic condition. In term of expected mean and variance returns, we use historical mean and variance/covariance matrices for each economic condition. We update the historical matrices when a new nber's announcement is recorded.
We also apply Huberman and Kandel (1987) to test for the mean-variance spanning of the with-and without-commodity frontiers. Lastly, we also check the robustness of our results for uk and Japan investors.
Results from our empirical test in the Gorton's sample show that there is an interaction effect of business cycle and monetary policy in asset allocation. This interaction effect and the three-stages solution resolve the controversy in the application of Gorton et al. and Jensen et al. findings . The results also indicate that a three-stage business cycle makes more sense than a two-stage one. Considering the correlation between commodity futures and inflation, and the link between commodity returns and industrial production, we find that the better performance of commodity futures under some conditions is mainly driven by the link with real economic activity, not by the positive correlation between commodity futures and inflation.
More importantly, with our anticipated three-stage business cycle we can take advantage of the business cycle's implication in asset allocation. Our out-of-sample test confirms that the full tactical asset strategy of taking into account both the monetary policy condition and the stages of business cycle conditions works better than any other strategy including Gorton et al., Jensen et al. and unconditional ones in terms of higher return Sharpe ratio. Specifically, our tactical strategy is to hold commodity futures index (i) with a restrictive policy: in middle, late booms and during the recession; and (ii) under an expansive: in a boom, and to sell otherwise.
Our tactical strategy is tested out-of-sample. We can also show that there are significant benefits from including a commodity futures index in the investment portfolio under most conditions, not only for us investors but also for British and Japanese players.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we describe our data, the results from a preliminary analysis and our proposed methodology for solving the controversy.
In Section 2, following the in-sample analysis, we suggest the tactical asset strategy. We check for the validity of the proposed strategy in the out-of-sample in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Preliminary Analysis and Proposed Solutions to the Conflict
In this section, we first describe our data. We then do preliminary tests to replicate Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) and Jensen at al. (2002) conclusions and confirm the conflict in their findings. We lastly suggest two possible solutions.
Data and sample
We use monthly total return 3 to perform our analysis. The benchmark portfolio for an us investor includes four assets: (i) us stocks: us index from Morgan Stanley Capital International According to Erb and Harvey (2006) , the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (gsci) Composite is more suitable than an equally-weighted commodity index as provided by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , or by Center Research Bureau (crb index), or the Dow Jones AIG index.
Currently, the gsci Composite (henceforth gsci) includes nearby futures contracts for 24 commodities in 5 components: Energy (accounting for 71.80% dollar weights), Industrial Metals (7.41%), Precious Metal (3.09%), Agricultural (13.73%) and Livestock (3.96%). The gsci total return index measures the payoff from a fully-collateralized commodity futures. It equals the return to a long position in the futures contract plus the T-bill rate. As a consequence, it is comparable to the total return index when investing in stocks or bonds.
To verify Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) 's conclusion, we also apply our analysis to their equally-weighted commodity index without energy components, grci. We download the grci total return index from the nber web site. The other data we use are all from Datastream. Jensen et al. (2002) and In this section, the sample analyzed is the GR sample from 4/1973 to 12/2007. Following Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) , we consider the performance of assets in different stages of business cycles. The recession and boom periods are identified by the nber and then are divided into early and late phases. Jensen et al. (2002) , on the other hand, examine asset performance in different monetary policy phases: restrictive and expansive. They use the Fed discount rate to define phases: when the discount rate is raised a restrictive monetary policy is said to apply while the reverse is referred to as an expansive monetary policy. A new monetary policy starts when the sign of the discount rate change shifts from negative to positive and via versa. Also following Jensen et al. (2002) Comparing gsci with grci, we find that gsci provides higher return and Sharpe ratio than grci especially either in the recession period or during the restrictive monetary phase. This motivates our choice of using gsci.
Empirical results following

Solutions to the conflict
Dividing a business cycle into three instead of two stages:
We have two suggestions to solve the above conundrum. First, we propose to divide the business cycles into three stages, early, middle and late, instead of two stages. Looking at the difference in mean returns between early and late stages in Table 1 , we recognize that the differences are quite big especially in the recession period. In addition, from 1973 until now the average duration of a recession cycle is about 12 months and the maximum duration is 16 months. The corresponding numbers for a boom are 60 and 120 months. Combining the long duration for a business cycle and the big differences in average returns between the early and late stages, we suggest to divide the business cycle into three stages: early, middle and late.
We expect to observe a clear-cut difference among the three stages during the recession period but not during the boom period because in general the economic situation is more stable in a boom than in a recession. Moreover, in a recession the measures that need to be applied to revive the economy vary depending on the severity of the recession. Thus the economic conditions will be different whether we are in early, middle or late stage of the recession.
We use ols to estimate the following system in order to obtain the mean return and the significance tests for each asset in different economic conditions: In Table 2 , we report the average returns of assets in different stages of recessions and booms: we report the sum of coefficients α + δ b + δ b,s for each condition. The numbers in brackets are the t-statistics of the tests whether a coefficient might be zero, i.e. whether a sub-sample mean is statistically different from its more general mean. The 'prob' columns report the probabilities from the Wald tests on the significance of the differences among mean returns of three stages in recessions and booms. There are 16 out of 30 t-statistics telling us that the mean return in a condition is significantly different from the general mean. The Wald tests confirm that there are significant differences in the assets' mean returns among three stages except for us stocks in boom periods. When dividing the business cycle into three stages, we find that commodity futures indices provide higher returns than stocks and bonds in the middle and late boom and in the early and middle recession. This result is different from Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) findings (where they only consider two stages) in that now the middle stages are found to be attractive too, not just the late boom and early recession period.
To test where a 3-way split does better than a 2-way, we apply the Diebold and Mariano (1995) (DM) statistical test to compare the squared residuals obtained from 3-stage and 2-stage model as defined in Equation (1). Let the difference in the squared residuals be dr t ≡ res3 2 t −res2 2 t , with res3 t and res3 t the residuals at t obtained from 3-stage and 2-stage models. The DM statistic can be computed as the t-statistic in a regression of dr t on a constant with Newey-West standard error. The sign of the coefficient in this regression indicates the direction of the rejection of the two-sided DM test. If in our test, we observe a negative coefficient, this implies that res3 2 < res2 2 , i.e. the 3-stage model does better than the 2-stage one. Look at the left panel of Table 3 where we report the DM test for business cycle. The results show that Keys: 1. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics of the coefficients (δ b,s ) from the regression of each asset return on the system:
with the restrictions: for all assets except corporate bonds, the 3-stage model has lower squared residuals than the 2-stage one, suggesting that the 3-way split does better than the 2-way. While the differences are not statically significant, the consistency across assets is nevertheless encouraging. Thus, we pursue what seems to be a more promising definition of stages, the threefold one.
The interaction effects of monetary policy and business cycle on asset returns:
Our reading of the comparative returns of commodities versus stocks is that financial investors seem to be smarter than the purchase officers in the companies, with share markets reacting to industrial production before the fact while purchase managers do so after the fact. Suppose a recession has been announced a few months ago, meaning that it is actually already starting to bottom out (we're in phase 3 of a 12-month recession). Stock markets duly anticipate a revival, so they start rising again, but purchase managers are still cutting their inventories or, at least, are not yet rebuilding them. As a result, commodities do relatively poorly. This under-performance of commodities versus shares continues until the expansion is well under way, at which point the purchase managers hurriedly start to rebuild inventories. That is, as of the middle of an expansion the commodity markets belatedly catch up with renewed industrial activity, thus overtaking stock markets in terms of return. Commodity demand starts falling only after a recession has been announced (i.e. after phase 2 of a recession), while stock markets saw the storm coming much earlier. Thus, commodity markets continue to beat stock markets until well into a recession, at which point commodity demand dwindles and prices plummet.
Stocks do less badly, and already see the next revival coming; that is, the story begins a new.
In Table 4 , we examine the average returns of different monetary policies in different stages of business cycles. The means are again computed and tested via a variance-analysis regression, Keys: 1. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics of the coefficients (δ m,b,s ) from the regression of each asset return on the system: Table 3 , we again find that the 3-stage way consistently performs better than 2-stage one, albeit still not significantly so.
From Table 4 , we also find that, differently from and Jensen et al. (2002) findings, under a restrictive policy commodity futures indices do not work better than stocks and bonds in early boom stages while under the expansive policy, commodity futures do outperform stocks in the early and middle stages of the recession. This result suggests that commodity futures should still be held in the early stage of the current recession even if an expansive monetary policy is followed. These findings also help to explain the contradiction between their findings. The above facts make their conclusions weaker in the sense that (i) periods of a late recession or a middle boom still bring higher returns for commodities; (ii) a restrictive policy does not always result in better performance for commodities; (iii) even an expansive policy in the early stage of a recession still works for commodity futures. Again, purchase managers seem to watch industrial activity and ignore monetary clues.
We now try to find out the reason for the better performance of commodity futures over stocks in some economic conditions, i.e whether it is because of (i) the positive correlations between inflation and commodity futures; or (ii) close links between commodity futures and the real economic activity.
1.4 Who play the role in better performance for commodity futures: inflation or the real economic activity?
In Table 5 , we report the Sharpe ratios, monthly correlations between indices' returns and their correlations with us inflation and production growth. The result indicates that Sharpe ratios are in line with our findings based on the mean returns: commodity futures indices perform better (provide a better trade-off for high return against standard deviation) than stocks (i) when a restrictive policy is applied in the middle, late booms and in recessions; (ii) when an expansive policy is applied in the early and middle recessions. We also find that signs and values of the correlations between commodity futures and stocks/bonds vary across monetary policy and stages of business cycle. This again suggests that optimal asset allocations may depend on both monetary policy and stages of business cycle. This result is different from Jensen et al. (2002) who find no substantial difference in the correlations between commodity futures and equity across monetary policy. It may be because they do not consider monetary policy in different stages of business cycle.
Considering the correlations between commodity futures and inflation, unlike Gorton and
Rouwenhorst (2005), we do not find positive correlations between commodity futures and inflation for all periods, not even for periods when commodity futures perform better than stocks and bonds. In addition, we do not observe opposite exposures of commodity futures to inflation compared to stocks in all cases when commodity futures perform better than stocks.
These results question on the role of commodity futures as an inflation hedge: commodity futures perform better than stocks/bonds in some economic neither because of their positive correlations with inflation nor because of an opposite exposure to inflation compared to stocks.
Thus, the relationship between commodity futures and inflation does not really help to explain the better performance of commodity futures in some economic conditions. In contrast, when looking at the correlations between the commodity futures and production growth, we find that for a majority of cases (representing 271 out of 402 months) commodity futures returns have positive correlation with production growth while us stocks only have positive correlation with production growth for 52 out of 402 months when a restrictive policy is applied in late recessions (3 months) and middle booms (49 months). This indicates that commodity futures has a closer link to production growth than stock and that this fact can help to explain the better return of commodity futures index in some economic conditions.
To check whether the link between commodity futures returns and industrial production help us to explain our findings. Figure 1 shows the mean returns in each of the six stages, first unconditionally on monetary policy, and then split up per type of monetary policy. We first discuss the unconditional data. 6 A first conclusion is that inflation is counter-cyclical: high in recessions, low in booms, with a difference between the two of about 4 percent per annum. This is in line with earlier findings by e.g. Fama (1982) , who refers to the Cambridge Equation. This says that money demand rises with output and prices, albeit not necessarily in proportion with each of them.
For constant money supply, prices would then fall when output rises and vice versa. The negative relation between growth and inflation would persist as long as money supply changes 3. We color grey for economic conditions which have have less than 10 observations. We bold positive correlations between commodity futures and production. 
(c) Expansive policy
Note: In these graphs, we plot the mean of inflation, of percentage changes for industrial production, stock and commodity futures prices in different economic conditions. 'Rec' ('boom') means a recession (boom) business cycle.
by less than what is needed to accommodate the effect of real growth on money demand.
A second conclusion is that, commonsensically, commodity prices are related to industrial production rather than general inflation. They fall when output falls, and rise when output resumes, but continue rising after output growth has reached its boom plateau. There is certainly no trace of commodity prices leading output, a view The Economist occasionally quotes.
Stocks, thirdly, are also IP-related, but rather tend to lead: they start rising in the late recession periods, after which returns remain flat throughout the boom. Note that these last two observations, taken together, explain why stocks do better than commodities in late recessions and early booms, and vice versa.
When we turn to the difference between expansive and restrictive monetary phases, one striking difference is that, during restrictive phases, inflation was on average higher and stocks generally do worse. The relations between the cycles remain similar, though. The anticyclical behavior of inflation, for instance, is present in both monetary regimes. The only strong change in patterns, across the two scenarios, is observed in late recessions, where commodities seem to peak under restrictive circumstances and crash under an expansionary policy. This is hard to explain, and the extremely low numbers of observations tell us that it may just be a fluke, especially the peak, which is based on a mere three observations.
To sum up, all of above results demonstrate that both the real economic activity and discount rates play important role in the better performance of commodity futures in some economic conditions. The results also show that it may be better to include futures contracts in a diversified portfolio in such economic situations. However, all findings in this section are based on the in-sample analysis. In addition, as the business cycle are ex post, we cannot use the Fed's announcement to get stages for tactical asset allocation. Therefore, in the next section, we propose our tactical asset allocation and the method to get ex ante stages for a business cycle. We then apply our strategy and method to test out-of-sample.
A proposed tactical asset allocation from in-sample analysis
Here we have supposed to forget the explanatory results of Section 1. In this section, we use monthly data from 1/1970 to 12/1985 for the in-sample analysis to set up our strategy. The rules are then tested out of sample in the remaining 12 years of data.
A suggested method to have ex ante stages of a business cycle
The preliminary analysis suggest that commodity futures provide higher returns and Sharpe ratios than stocks and bonds under some specific circumstances depending on monetary policy and stages of business cycle. We can easily apply the implication of monetary policy in asset allocation because the Fed discount rate change in previous period is known. However, stages of a business cycle are to some extent unforeseeable. In this section we want to avoid hindsight and to work with ex ante stages of a business cycle, stages that we can realistically use in asset 
Assets returns in the in-sample analysis
In Table 6 , we report the in-sample average returns of assets for various economic circumstances based on our proposed method in dividing the business cycle into anticipated stages. Because in the 1970-1985 period there are only 14 recession months in which an expansive policy is applied (4 months for the early stage and 10 months of the late stage), we do not divide these 14 months into 3 stages in our analysis. In addition, as we only have data for us corporate bonds as of 1/1973, we do not include bonds in this table.
First, the last two rows of the table show that there is no big difference between the number of observations in ex ante stages and actual (ex post) stages. This confirms the usefulness of our way in getting anticipated stages. Second, in this period we still find that 30 of the 50 conditional mean returns for different economic conditions are statistically different from the general mean, and this is especially true for commodity futures. We also find that mean returns of assets are significantly different across the three stages, except for us stock in booms with a restrictive policy. Third, commodity futures returns are higher than stock returns when a Keys: 1. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics of the coefficients (δ m,b,s ) from the regression of each asset return on the system: restrictive policy is followed in the middle, late boom and in the whole recession. In addition, for most of economic condition, we again find that gsci perform better than Gorton and Rouwenhorst index (grci), so from now on we only report results for gsci index. Fifth, another important result that should be noted is: when the expansive policy is applied in the boom, commodity futures return is lower than that of stock but is still positive for all stages.
Therefore, in such conditions, we can also get benefits from holding commodity futures.
A proposed tactical asset allocation
Our proposed tactical asset allocation is: hold either when the expected commodity futures return is higher than that of stocks return or when it is positive and sell otherwise. In light of the assets' returns in-sample and our proposed tactical asset allocation, investors should go long with commodity futures in their diversified portfolios (i) with a restrictive policy: in the middle and late stages of a boom and during the recession; and (ii) under an expansive policy: in a boom. 7 Note that the latter case would have led to shorting under Jensen's strategy, as futures returns, even though positive, are below stock return.
To test for the performance and the advantage of our proposed asset allocation for this in-sample, we compare the conditional mean returns, Sharpe ratios of gsci from four tactical strategies with the unconditional mean returns, Sharpe ratios of stocks, bonds and gsci. With the unconditional term, we mean that we just buy and hold assets, and that we consider neither the business cycle condition nor the monetary condition in allocation assets. For the conditional strategies, we take into account the economic condition to decide when to hold long versus short positions. Both unconditional and conditional strategies are stand-alone, i.e. purely one-asset based; we do not yet build portfolios. The four conditional strategies to compare are:
• the '2stg cycle' strategy: the 2-stage business cycle strategy which only follows the business cycle condition and is proposed by Gorton et al. (hold commodity futures in early recession and late boom and short otherwise)
• the '3stg cycle' strategy: the ex ante 3-stage business cycle strategy from Section 1 which also only follows business cycle condition but on the basis of three anticipated stages (go long commodity futures in middle, late booms and in early, middle recessions and go short otherwise)
• the 'monetary' strategy: a strategy bases on the monetary policy condition regardless of the business cycle, as proposed by Jensen et al.'s 2002 (hold commodity futures when a restrictive policy is applied and sell when there is an expansive policy)
• the 'full' strategy: the proposed strategy which considers both the monetary policy and the business cycle conditions
The total returns to a short position of commodity futures index is calculated as the negative percentage change in the futures price index plus the 1-month T-bill rate. From Table 7 , it is clear that the full strategy results in the highest average return and Sharpe ratios for the conditional stand-alone gsci compared with other strategies of asset allocation. The average return and Sharpe ratio of the conditional gsci from the full strategy are much higher than stocks or bonds or the unconditional (the buy-and-hold) gsci. It is also notable that in this period, policies that focus on either business cycle or monetary condition result in lower mean return and Sharpe ratio than buying and holding gsci (the unconditional strategy). This questions the validity of the tactical strategies proposed by Gorton et al. and Jensen et al. . Table 7 show that the 3-stage way does better than the 2-stage one with higher mean return and Sharpe ratio. 8
Again, results in
However, all of results until now are just based on in-sample analysis and for the us investor only. To confirm the success of the full tactical asset allocation, in the next section we test the strategy in out-of-sample period not only for us but also for British and Japanese investors. 9
3 Out-of-sample results
Performance of stand-alone assets
The out-of-sample period is from 1/1986 to 8/2009. 10 To check for the validity of the full strategy, we first consider the performance of the stand-alone assets by comparing the conditional 8 In fact, we also apply these test for other four gsci sub-indices: Agricultural, Precious metal, Livestock and Non-energy. We find that gsci Composite always outperform its sub-indices with highest Sharpe ratio. We can provide the results for sub-indices upon request.
9 Due to insufficient number of observations (from 1999 to 2009), we cannot do the test for Germany. 10 We also test it for the period ending before the current crisis (1/1986 to 12/2007) . We obtain the same results as with our reported period.
gsci mean returns and Sharpe ratios from different strategies with the unconditional mean returns and Sharpes ratios of stocks, bonds and gsci for us, British and Japanese investors.
'Unconditional' here means buy-and-hold, while 'conditional' means we switch between short and long commodity position. The conditional strategies we consider are the '2stg cycle' (i.e. Gorton et al.) , the '3stg cycle', the 'monetary' (i.e. Jensen et al.) and the 'full' strategies which suggest to hold commodity under specific situation of the business cycle condition (for either 2 stages or 3 stages), the monetary condition, and both condition, respectively.
Relating to the '3stg cycle' and the 'full' strategies, we apply the rules from the in-sample analysis, but we follow new announcements of a business cycle to update their average durations in getting ex ante stages. From 1/1986 to 9/2009, we have five announcements for new business cycle in 7/1990, 3/1991, 3/2001, 11/2001 and 12/2007 . Following these announcements, our updated average durations for a reccession/boom are reported in Table 8 .
For British and Japanese investors we also take Morgan Stanley Capital International (msci) stock indices for these countries. Bond indices are benchmark 10-year government indices and interest rates are libor 1-month rates. We use msci exchange rates to convert usd prices into gbp and jpy. Again, all data are downloaded from Datastream. Based on available data, we can only do the test for Japan investors from 7/1986 to 9/2009. In Table 9 , we report the mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios of standalone performance of assets for unconditional and conditional allocations for us, British and Japanese investors. It is clear from the table that in out-of-sample, all results observed from the in-sample are still confirmed. First, also out-of-sample the full tactical allocation for commodity futures performs better than any other dynamic strategies in terms of both return and Sharpe ratio for all investors. This again confirms that it is better to consider both the business cycle and the monetary policy condition in asset allocation. Second, the full strategy also brings higher return and Sharpe ratio for the full-conditional gsci than the buy-and-hold stocks and bonds even though stocks and bonds performs, unconditionally, better than gsci.
The two exceptions are: for us and British investors, where the Sharpe ratio of conditional gsci from the full strategy is hardly better, or even slightly lower, than that of bonds. Third, in this period, we also observe that the 3-stage way performs better than the 2-stage method.
We also find the same results for the period ending before the current crisis i.e. from 1/1986 to 12/2007.
These results suggest that investors can get higher returns following the proposed tactical strategy than just holding the traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. However, this conclusion is just based on the average return and Sharpe ratio of the conditional stand-alone commodity index not on the portfolio as a whole. In the next subsection, we examine the performance of the out-of-sample optimal portfolio with and without commodity futures.
Performance of the optimal portfolio
In this step, we want to validate the full strategy which suggest to take into account both the business cycle condition and the monetary condition by comparing the performance of out-ofsample optimal portfolios from the full strategy with other 3 strategies. These 3 strategies are:
(i) the unconditional strategy; (ii) the '3stg cycle' strategy; 11 and (iii) the 'monetary' strategy.
We also compare the performance of optimal portfolios with and without commodity futures to check for the usefulness of including commodity futures in diversified portfolio. Please note that we can not undertake this test for British and Japanese investors because of insufficient observations. 12
We apply mean-variance (Markowitz) framework to construct the optimal portfolio without any constraint for the log utility investors. 13 The benchmark risky portfolio for investors includes their country stock indices, international stock (eafe), and their country bond indices.
Following mean-variance framework, the optimal weights for log utility investors are:
with W a 1 × 4 vector of assets' weights; E a 1 × 4 vector of assets' excess returns and Ω a 4 × 4 variance/covariance matric. The 1-month T-bill rate is used as a risk-free asset. To proxy for the expected excess return and covariance matrix, we use the historical data. We update the expected mean vector and covariance matrix once a new business cycle is announced by nber. 14 Following this way, for the full strategy, in light of the in-sample analysis, we calculate optimal weights for 6 conditions, i.e restrictive policies in recessions; restrictive policies in different stages (early, middle, late) of booms; expansive policies in recessions; and expansive policies in expansions. Please note that we do not divide three situations into stages of business cycles because of insufficient observations and also because in these situations we have same strategy (long/short) for different stages. To do it, we estimate mean vectors and covariance matrices for these 6 conditions with the ex ante stages and update them when a new business cycle is announced. We also need to estimate 6 mean vector and covariance matrices at each time for the '3stg cycle' strategy, i.e: 3 for each cycle (a recession or a boom). For the unconditional strategy, we only need to estimate and update one mean vector and covariance matrix for the whole sample while for the 'monetary' strategy at each time of updating we 11 We don't test for the '2stg cycle' strategy as we know that it does worse than the '3stg cycle' one.
12 We only have data for British investor from 1/1996 and for Japanese investors from 7/1986, so we don't have enough data to have initial (pre-test-period) mean and variance/covariance matrices. 13 We allow short-sales and borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate.
14 We also update the expected mean vector and covariance matrix when either a new business cycle is announced or a new monetary policy is observed. However, this way is worse than the way we report in the paper.
need to estimate two vectors and covariance matrices for restrictive and expansive policies.
From our data there is however one problem with the calculated weights based on Equation Table 10 ). To solve this problem, we rescale the first-stage weights such that either the short side or the long side sums to unity, and the other side below unity. That is, first we add weights of the same sign together. We then divide each calculated weights by the maximum value between the absolutes of total negative weights and total positive weights to have the adjusted weights. The weight for risk-free asset is equal one minus sum of adjusted weights of all risky assets in the portfolio. The adjusted optimal weights are reported in Panel B of the same table. Considering the signs of optimal weights, we find that for most of the conditions they are consistent with the full tactical allocation. 15
In Table 11 , we report the performance of out-of-sample optimal portfolios for different strategies. The results in this test show that the optimal portfolio following the full condition has higher return and Sharpe ratio than either the unconditional or other conditional strategies.
This again confirms that both the business cycle condition and the monetary condition are relevance in asset allocation. It is also clear that the inclusion of commodity futures index in portfolio brings benefits for the investors. Comparing the performances of optimal portfolios with the performances of stand-alone assets in Table 9 , we find that the optimally diversified portfolio following the full strategy has a higher return and Sharpe ratio than any stand-alone assets for unconditional as well as conditional strategies. Note that under the pure Gorton and Jensen approaches, portfolio containing commodity do not even beat a pure bond portfolio (compare Table 9 and Table 11 ), so the full strategy does add value.
To sum up, the out-of-sample test confirms that the full strategy with taking into account both the business cycle condition and the monetary policy condition brings higher returns and Sharpe ratios for diversified portfolio than any strategy that only considers one type of information or ignores both. Including commodity futures index in a diversified portfolio seems to create a better benefit for investors than neglecting it. The way of dividing the business cycle into three stages and the method of getting anticipated stages of a cycle help investors to make use of the implication of business cycle and monetary policy in constructing their optimal portfolio. 15 We can provide the optimal weights for other strategies upon request. 
with m the maximum absolute values between the sum of negative weights and sum of positive weights. 3. Our anticipated business cycle stages are applied in this analysis. Before we proceed to the conclusion, we want to examine whether a significant benefit is really obtained from the inclusion of commodity futures in a portfolio of stocks and bonds by undertaking the spanning test for the mean-variance frontiers with gsci.
Spanning test for the mean-variance frontiers
We apply Huberman and Kandel (HK) (1987) to test of whether adding commodity futures to portfolio shifts the frontier leftward. The hypothesis is that diversifying the portfolio (with commodity futures) shifts the frontier to the left (higher return, lower risk) which can be false if and only if the commodity futures index returns are mean-variance spanned by the benchmark assets. Following HK test, we estimate the following equation with ols:
with R C,t , R stock,t , R EAF E,t , and R bond,t the monthly returns of commodity futures index, msci stock, eafe international stock, and bonds at time t. According to Huberman and Kandel (1987) , the commodity futures index is spanned by the other assets in the benchmark set if and only if the following two conditions hold: (i) α = 0; and (ii)
In this out-of-sample test, there are only 5 observations for the recession under the restrictive, 31 observations (8, 9 and 14 observations for the early, middle and late ex ante stages) for the recession under the expansive, and 0 and 8 observations for the ex ante early and middle boom under the restrictive. Therefore, in the analysis below, we do not divide into stages for (i) recessions when either a restrictive policy or an expansive policy is applied, and (ii) for booms when the restrictive policy is followed. Table 12 reports the mean-variance spanning test results. We reject the null hypothesis that commodities are spanned by other assets in thirteen out of eighteen cases at the 10% significance level and in twelve cases even at less than 5% significance. The rejection means that in most RC,t = α + β1R stock,t + β1R eaf e,t + β1R bond,t + t with R C,t , R stock,t , R eaf e,t , and R bond,t the monthly returns. 2. F is the test statistic from Wald test that α = 0 and β1 + β2 + β3 = 1. 3. p-value is the probability corresponding to the χ 2 -statistic.
cases the inclusion of commodity futures index in the benchmark portfolio almost surely does help to shift the frontier leftward and/or upward. The exception is when a recession coincides with an expansive policy for us investors (a case with a very low number of observations). The findings of almost no significant benefit from including gsci in the diversified portfolio in boom stages under the expansive are consistent with the fact that in these periods gsci return has a positive correlation with stock return. In general, however, for most of economic conditions
we can obtain significant benefits from diversifying a portfolio with commodity futures. 16
Conclusion
Commodity futures index has been proved to provide diversification benefits for an investment portfolio. The current literature shows that gains from holding long commodity futures in a diversified portfolio depend either on the business cycle (Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) ) or on the monetary policy (Jensen et al (2002) ). However, there is a conflict when one tries to apply both Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) and Jensen et al. (2002) in asset allocation in most of recessions, i.e. when activity is down but monetary policy is expansive. To solve this problem, this paper studies the interaction impact of business cycle and monetary policy in tactical asset allocation with commodity futures. We find that there is indeed an interaction effect between these two economic factors and that we should not only watch one of these indicators to allocate assets in different economic conditions.
More specifically, we have four refinements to the tactical asset strategy which are different from Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) and Jensen et al. (2002) . First, we suggest to divide a business cycle into three stages instead of only two stages as in Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) .
Through the DM test, we show that three stages is better than Gorton's two stages. Second, we 16 The above test rests on the assumption that there is no risk-free asset and thus there is no short-selling, borrowing and lending. If we relax this assumption, to test for the significance of the demand for futures, we simply use excess return in Equation (7) instead of total return, and we test for α = 0 without any constraint on the βs. This test is based on the fact that the optimal weights of asset C in its portfolio is given by Wc = 
Thus, testing for a nonzero α c means testing whether the asset should be held. With this test (we can provide results upon request), the conclusions are much weaker: we have only four over eighteen cases where α is statistically significant. Therefore, following this test, it is far less clear that the diversified portfolio is better than the benchmark portfolio. Much of the attraction of commodities come from diversification, but when a risk free asset is added, risk reduction can be achieved via that new asset too. But part of the story seems to be low statistical power too: the results are the same when we apply the test for bonds, and stocks.
propose to consider the business cycle in the context of monetary policy to decide on tactical asset allocation. Third, in order to exploit business cycle implication in asset allocation, we use the average durations of business cycles to obtain feasible, anticipated three-stage business cycle. Finally, we test out-of-sample and investigate the statistical significance. We find that the out-of-sample optimal portfolio following our tactical asset strategy has higher return and Sharpe ratio than the stand-alone stocks, bonds, and commodity futures. This out-of-sample test for the optimal portfolio has not yet done before. Especially, we also find that the optimal portfolios applying Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2005) and Jensen et al. (2002) strategies perform worse than the pure bonds portfolio. Thus, our full strategy really add value. We can also
show that it is not the positive relationship between commodity futures and inflation but the close link between commodity futures and real economic activity that brings higher return for commodity futures than stocks and bonds in some specific economic conditions.
Following the in-sample analysis and ex ante stages, the proposed tactical allocation is:
hold commodity futures (i) with a restrictive policy: in the middle and late boom and during the the recession; and under an expansive policy: in the boom, otherwise sell. This strategy is confirmed by (i) the higher return of the managed stand-alone commodity futures in the out-of-sample; (ii) the signs of the out-of-sample optimal weights of the efficient frontiers and (iii) the significant results from the Huberman and Kandel (1987) spanning test for the two frontiers. The full strategy not only works for us investors but also for British and Japanese investors in most conditions.
